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Applying the Eligibility Rule in
Securities Arbitration: Resolving

Circuit Court Conflict Regarding the
Proper Role of Arbitrators and Courts
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc./
I. INTRODUCTION
Client agreements between securities brokers and investors typically contain
an arbitration clause. By agreeing to arbitrate disputes arising out of the investment relationship, brokerage customers give up their right to seek redress through
the judicial system. Instead, they must arbitrate their claims before one of the
securities industry's self-regulatory organizations. Each self-regulatory organization utilizes a code of procedure to govern its arbitration proceedings. Each code
of procedure has an eligibility provision that bars a claim from arbitration unless it
is filed within six years of the event or occurrence giving rise to the claim.
The eligibility rule has spawned a great deal of litigation determining whether
a court or an arbitrator should determine a claim's timeliness. As a result, a profound split has occurred among the circuit courts. Some circuits hold that the rule
acts as a substantive limitation on the arbitrator's jurisdiction and therefore, it is
the proper role of a court to apply the timeliness provision. Other circuits hold
that the rule serves as a statute of limitations and that the arbitrator is to make
eligibility determinations. Whether the arbitrator or a court applies the rule is
important to both the investor and the securities firm. An investor with a possibly
untimely claim would prefer to have the issue resolved by the arbitrator, who,
with a more equitable than a strictly legal role, may be convinced to allow equitable arguments that might not be available in court. The brokerage, on the other
hand, would desire a court to decide the issue, expecting the time limit to be rigidly enforced.
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
reviewed a Tenth Circuit holding that the eligibility rule presented a question of
arbitrability, and was thus for the court to decide. Reversing, the Supreme Court
held that the arbitrator, not a court, should apply the time limit rule. The Court's
decision resolves the split among the circuit courts in addition to allowing arbitration clauses in securities firms' client agreements to serve their purpose of providing an efficient and less costly method of litigating disputes relating to investment
accounts, ultimately increasing investor confidence in the securities industry.

I. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1986, Karen Howsam opened securities accounts with the investment
company Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Dean Witter). 2 Dean Witter and its registered representative purchased four limited partnerships for the accounts at an
approximate cost of $550,000. 3 The partnerships were represented to Howsam as
4
long-term investments that would increase in value as well as provide income.
Through March 1992, the partnerships were listed on monthly account statements
at their purchase costs value instead of their current market value.5 After March
1992, the account statements no longer valued the partnerships it all, but Dean
Witter's registered representative continued to assure Howsam that they were
viable investments. 6 In late 1994, Howsam received information from the partnerships indicating that the investments had suffered serious losses in value since
their purchase in 1986.7 Shortly thereafter, Howsam closed her investment accounts with Dean Witter.8
In March 1997, Howsam commenced an arbitration proceeding in accordance
with a client service agreement she had signed in 1992 (1992 agreement). 9 The
1992 agreement, which Dean Witter drafted:
The Client agrees that all controversies between the Client and Dean Witter... concerning or arising from (i) any account maintained with Dean
Witter by Client; (ii) any transaction involving Dean Witter and Client..
. or (iii) the construction, performance or breach of this or any other
agreement . . . shall be determined by arbitration before any self-

regulatory organization or exchange of which Dean Witter is a member.
The Client may elect which of these arbitration forums shall hear the
matter .... 10
Howsam filed a claim alleging that Dean Witter and its representatives
breached their fiduciary duty, and Howsam chose to arbitrate before a threemember arbitration panel of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD)." The breaches included failure to recommend investments which were
suited to Howsam's investment objectives, failure to advise her that the investments were or had become unsuitable for her, and failure to monitor the investso she could make informed deciments and to keep her apprised of their value
2
sions with respect to their sale or retention.

2.
3.
800).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
at 81.
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (No. 01Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 261 F.3d 956, 958 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id.

II. Id.
12. Id.
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In 1997, in order to commence the arbitration claim before the NASD,
Howsam signed a submission agreement (1997 agreement) in which she agreed
that the arbitration would be conducted in accordance with the NASD's Code of
Arbitration Procedure (NASD Code). 13 The NASD Code § 10304 provides that
"[n]o dispute, claim, or controversy, shall be eligible for submission to arbitration
under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from
the occurrence of the event
14
giving rise to act or dispute, claim or controversy.'
In response, Dean Witter filed a complaint in the district court seeking declaratory relief and to enjoin the arbitration from proceeding. 15 Dean Witter contended that the events giving rise to the arbitration claims occurred more than six
years prior to the commencement of arbitration, thus making them ineligible for
arbitration pursuant to the 1997 agreement and the incorporated eligibility rule in
NASD Code § 10304.16
Howsam moved to dismiss Dean Witter's complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that eligibility was a question for the NASD arbitrator.' 7 The
district court determined that NASD Code § 10304 "clearly and unmistakably
evidences the parties' intention to have all disputed issues, including those of
eligibility of arbitration, arbitrated and not judicially determined."' 18 Holding that
the arbitrator, not the court, must determine the eligibility issues presented by
Dean Witter's complaint, the district court granted Howsam's motion to dismiss,
and Dean Witter appealed.19
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized "that the
circuit courts of appeals are almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the
limitations period set forth in NASD Code § 10304 is a substantive eligibility
requirement, or jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration, which must be determined in the first instance by the courts.' 2 ° In its view, application of NASD
Code § 10304 presented a question of the underlying dispute's arbitrability; and
the presumption is that a court, not an arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question. 2' Reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had erred in finding that the parties "clearly and unmistakably" agreed to allow the arbitrator, rather than the courts, to decide
whether specific disputes are arbitrable.22
Howsam petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Tenth Circuit's decision. 23 The Supreme Court stated that ordinarily the question of whether a dispute should go to arbitration is one for the courts to decide, unless the parties
"clearly and unmistakably" agree that it is a question for the arbitrator.2 4 The
13. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82.
14. NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10304 (2003).
15. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82.
16. Id.
17. Howsam, 261 F.3d at 959.
18. Id. at 960.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 970-71.
21. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82.
22. Howsam, 261 F.3d at 958. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944
(1995) ("Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is
'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so." (citations omitted)).
23. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
24. Id. (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
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Court however, found this presumption to only apply in the "narrow circumstances where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter," not to situations where the parties expect that an arbitrator would make the determination. 25 In these situations, the presumption reverses, and the "gateway" procedural questions are not for the judge, but for an
arbitrator to decide.26 The Court held that, in the absence of any statement to the
contrary in the arbitration agreement, it is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the agreement to reflect that understanding. 27 Thus, the Court concluded,
the application of the NASD's eligibility or time limit rule, NASD Code § 10304,
is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not the judge.28
III. LEGAL HISTORY
Before opening an account with a securities broker, an investor is typically
required to sign a client agreement containing an arbitration clause. 29 By signing
the client agreement, the investor agrees to submit any dispute he or she may have
30
with the broker or securities firm to a self-regulatory organization (SRO) fo31
rum. In the last two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld this practice of
requiring investors to consent to arbitration of disputes before an SRO.32
A. The FederalArbitrationAct and its Application to Securities Arbitration
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 33 to end the judicial hostility toward arbitration and to place agreements to arbitrate "upon the
same footing as other contracts. 34 Section Two of the FAA provides that written
agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the .revocation of any contract."35 The
FAA advances arbitration by establishing enforceability of arbitration agreements
in federal courts. 36 The FAA enables federal courts to stay litigation when the
underlying controversy may be resolved by arbitration. 37 It also empowers federal
courts to compel arbitration if a party that has previously agreed to arbitrate later
refuses. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as establishing a national policy enforcing private agreements to arbitrate and has stated that any
25. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-84.
26. Id. at 84 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).
27. Id. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
28. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82-86.
29. Margo E. K. Reder, Securities Law and Arbitration: The Enforceability of PredisputeArbitration Clauses in Broker-Customer Agreements, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 91, 92.
30. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines an SRO as "any national securities exchange,
registered securities association, or registered clearing agency." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000).
31. Reder, supra note 29, at 92.
32. Infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
33. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
34. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (199 1).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
36. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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doubts concerning the arbitrability of an issue should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 39 The Court has also held that the FAA permits the creation
of a federal
40
substantive law that is applicable in federal as well as state courts.
Early on, the Supreme Court was not as willing to extend this policy favoring
arbitration to cases involving securities arbitration as readily as it had in other
situations like labor arbitration. In 1953, the Court first reviewed the interaction
of the FAA and securities regulation in Wilko v. Swan, and it established a policy
of protecting investors from securities brokers.42 Wilko involved a broker who
moved to compel arbitration of an investor's claim in accordance with a preexisting arbitration agreement between the parties.43 The Court held that despite the
agreement to arbitrate, protection of the investor's rights required judicial review
of the claim. 44 This decision in effect invalidated pre-dispute arbitration agreements between investors and securities firms.45
In 1974, the Supreme Court began to retreat from the decision in Wilko and
ultimately overruled it in 1989.46 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court held
that the FAA required a dispute between two parties to be arbitrated according to a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement.47 In the 1985 case Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd, the Court upheld an arbitration of state claims in order to uphold a policy
of enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate.48 In the same year, the Court
decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., which holds
that commercial agreements to arbitrate must be enforced according to their
terms.49 In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, decided in 1987, the
Court placed arbitration on an equal footing with judicial review as a means of
resolving securities disputes, noting that nothing in the use of arbitration inherently infringed upon a customer's substantive rights. 50 Finally, in 1989, the Supreme Court overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.51 In Rodriguez, the court abandoned the Wilko approach of disfavoring
the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate and mandated that52courts
enforce those agreements for all claims arising under federal securities law.

39. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v.

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
40. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984).

41. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
42. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427.
43. Id. at 429.

44. Id. at 437-38.
45. Id.
46. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
47. 417 U.S. at 519-20.

48. 470 U.S. at 219-21.
49. 473 U.S. at 628.
50. 482 U.S. at 230-32.
51. 490 U.S. at 484.

52. Id. at 484-85.
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B. DeterminingArbitrability
In AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, the Supreme
Court developed the standard for determining whether arbitrators or courts should
decide if disputes are arbitrable under pre-dispute arbitration agreement.5 3 In
AT&T, the Court was petitioned to review a lower court order compelling arbitration of an arbitrability issue arising out of a dispute between a union and a company concerning the layoff of employees.5 4 The Court held that interpretation of
the arbitrability provisions is a function of the courts, reasoning that arbitration is
a matter of contract and a party that did not agree to arbitrate disputes cannot be
made to arbitrate those disputes. 5 The Court found that "the question of arbitrability... is undeniably an issue for judicial determination" and that "[u]nless the
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator." 56 Once
it is determined that the parties intended to submit the subject matter of the dispute
to arbitration, then the arbitrator, not the Court, determines all "procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition."" The
Court, however, offered no indication of exactly what language would be sufficient to satisfy the "clear and unmistakable" standard.58 This failure to specify
what language is necessary to satisfy the standard led to the Supreme Court's
decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan59 and ultimately to the circuit
split over the NASD's six-year eligibility provision.60
In First Options, the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a securities firm sought arbitration of a claim according to an arbitration clause contained
62
61
in its client agreements. The client, however, had failed to sign the agreement.
In its analysis, the Court focused on the underlying question of who should have
the power to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. 63 The answer to
this question, the Court stated, turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter.64 After all, "arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties. 65
Following its decision in AT&T, the Court held that "[c]ourts should not assume

53. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
54. Id. at 646-47.

55. Id. at 648-49; see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding
that state contract law governs questions of arbitrability according to the contract between the parties).
56. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649.
57. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
58. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649. Parties may agree to arbitrate arbitrability only if their agreement offers
clear and unmistakable evidence to do so. Id.
59. 514 U.S. 938 (1964).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 940-41.
62. Id. at 941.
63. Id. at 943.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1995) (holding that
the customer agreement must be interpreted in light of three established common law principles of
contract interpretation: first, customer agreements and the incorporated NASD Code should be construed as a single writing and therefore should be interpreted as a whole; second, all the documents
comprising the single agreement should be considered to be consistent with each other; third, ambiguous language should be construed against the drafting party.)
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that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did So.,'6 6 In its reasoning the court stated:
In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the question
'who (primarily) should decide arbitrability' differently from the way it
treats silence or ambiguity about the question 'whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid
arbitration agreement'-for in respect to this latter question the law reverses the presumption.67
As in AT&T, the Court again failed to specify what language would satisfy
the clear and unmistakable standard.68 The Court reached the conclusion that
absent a clear and unmistakable agreement to the contrary, courts, not arbitrators,
should resolve the question of arbitrability. 69 Thus, courts should only apply the
presumption in favor of arbitration where the issue is whether a dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement. 70 The presumption favoring arbitration should not be applied, and 7in fact should be reversed,
when deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. 1
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, the Supreme Court examined
whether courts or arbitrators are the appropriate bodies to determine whether a
procedural prerequisite had been satisfied, under which the arbitration agreement
conditioned the duty to arbitrate. 72 The procedural prerequisite in question was a
timeliness issue; did "the claims relate to a period beyond the limited term of the
agreement[?] ''73 In the dispute before the Court, the question could not be answered without considering the merits of the dispute itself. The Court reasoned
that "[n]either logic nor considerations of policy [would] compel" that "intertwined issues of 'substance' and 'procedure' growing out of a single dispute and
raising the same questions on the same facts ...[should]
be carved up between
74
two different forums, one decid[ed] after the other.,
The Court concluded that procedural issues should be left to the arbitrators
because the issues are often intertwined with the merits of the dispute, and, if reserved for the courts, could produce duplication of effort and an opportunity for
deliberate delay. 75 Thus, in holding that timeliness is an issue for the arbitrator,
the Supreme Court established that the court determines "substantive arbitrability"

66. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting AT&T Techs. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)); see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960).
67. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
68. Id. at 944-46.
69. Id. at 944-45.
70. ld.; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
The court stated that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration." Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp.v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1981); Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-83).
71. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
72. 376 U.S. 534, 544 (1964).
73. Id. at 554.
74. Id. at 557.
75. Id at 558.
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issues while the arbitrator determines "procedural arbitrability" issues. 76 Once a
court determines that the parties are obligated to arbitrate a dispute, "'procedural'
questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be
left to the arbitrator." 77 The Court added, "[R]egard[ing] procedural disagreements not as separate disputes but as aspects
of the dispute" fits best with the
"usual purposes of an arbitration clause." 78
C. The Eligibility Rule and the Circuit Court Split
All SROs that sponsor arbitration programs have adopted, with the approval
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Uniform Code of Arbitration,79
which was developed to create uniformity in the rules governing arbitration.
Therefore, the procedural rules that govern the arbitration will, for the most part,
be the same regardless of the SRO forum selected.80 The NASD's eligibility rule
underlying the instant case states that "[a] claim may be submitted for arbitration
as long as six years have not elapsed from the date of the occurrence or event
giving rise to the claim. ''8 t The event giving rise to the claim is typically, but not
necessarily, the date of securities purchase. 2 However, as in the instant case,
securities firms did not generally include the current value of the partnership investments in their customer statements, only the original purchase price. 3 The
North American State Securities Administrators ruled that this practice was
fraudulent and required brokers to disclose any decrease in the value of the limited
partnership from the time it was purchased. 84 As customers began to discover
these investment losses, they submitted claims to SRO arbitral forums.85 But, as
significant time elapsed between the purchase of the investments and the submission of claims to arbitration, the eligibility rule began to play a much more significant role in the outcome of disputes.86
While the case law appears settled that timeliness issues are to be decided by
the arbitrator, a split has arisen in the circuit courts regarding whether the arbitrator or a court should apply the NASD's eligibility rule.8 7 Five federal circuits
have held that the NASD's eligibility rule and parallel rules of other SRO's do not
"clearly and unmistakably" evidence the parties' intent as to whom should determine eligibility as required by the Supreme Court in AT&T Technologies and First

76. Id. at 544.
77. Id. at 557.
78. Id. at 559.
79. Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in Securities Arbitration: The
FurtherAggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 109, 120 (1996). Six years

was chosen because it coincided with the Securities and Exchange Commission's books and recordkeeping retention requirements. Id. at 141.

80. Id. at 120-121.
81. NASD, Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10304 (2003).
82. Harding, supra note 79, at 141.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.

87. NASD Code § 10304 is silent as to who shall apply the eligibility rule.
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Options. 88 In their analysis, the courts focused on the rule's use of the phrase
"eligible for submission to arbitration. 89 The courts reasoned that, because
arbitration of a claim is barred if it does not comply with the six-year time limit,
the eligibility rule is not a contractual timeliness requirement but a substantive
limitation, and thus a question of arbitrability for the courts to apply. 90
Five circuits have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the eligibility
rule is for the arbitrator to apply.9 These courts however, have not based their
decisions on uniform reasoning. 92 Not relying solely on the "plain language" of
the eligibility rule, the Fifth Circuit held that NASD Code § 10304 presents an
arbitrability question, but that it is more procedural than substantive and for the
arbitrator to decide. 93 The First Circuit held that the eligibility rule is presumed
not to be an arbitrability issue for judicial determination unless the parties "clearly
and unmistakably" intended to make it one.94 The Eighth Circuit, in contrast, read
the NASD Code as a whole and concluded that a separate provision, § 10324,
which provides that "arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions" of the Code, was "clear and unmistakable" evi-95
dence of the parties' intent to submit all arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.
The court held that "by adopting the NASD Code ...

as the rules governing their

dispute, [the securities firm] agreed to give the arbitrators
discretion via [§ 10324]
96
of that Code to interpret [§ 10304's] time limitation.,
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in Howsam was whether a court or
an NASD arbitrator should apply the NASD Code six-year claim eligibility provision to the underlying controversy. 97 The Court began its analysis by determining
whether application of the time limit rule involved a "question of arbitrability,"
which would make it "an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably provide[d] otherwise." 98 The Court acknowledged that a gateway question like the time-limit rule, which would determine whether the underlying controversy would proceed to arbitration on its merits, might be a "question of

88 See Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1996);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381 (11 th Cir. 1995); PaineWebber Inc.
v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993); Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992);
Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992).
89. Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1379; Roney & Co., 981 F.2d at 898-99; Sorrells, 957 F.2d at 512, 514;
Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 476-77, 479; Cohen, 62 F.3d at 384.
90. Supra note 89.
91. See PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996); PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d
1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995); FSC Sec.
Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994); O'Neel v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 667 F.2d 804 (9th
Cir. 1982).
92. Supra note 91.
93. Boone, 47 F.3d at 753-54.
94. Elahi, 87 F.3d at 599.
95. Freel, 14 F.3d at 1312.
96. Id. at 1313.
97. Howsom v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002).
98. Id. at 83 (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
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arbitrability." 99 It noted however, that by precedent, the phrase "question of arbitrability" has a much narrower scope.' 00 The Court has found the phrase applicable only in the limited circumstance where:
[C]ontracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided
the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought that they
had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate. 10

Thus, any gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by 0a2given arbitration clause raises a "question of arbitrability" for a court to decide.
However, the Court has found the phrase "question of arbitrability" not applicable in situations where the parties expect that an arbitrator, and not the court,
would decide the gateway matter. 0 3 Under these circumstances, gateway or procedural questions arising from the dispute and impacting the ultimate outcome of
the dispute "are presumptively
not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide,"
04
the Court stated.1
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) provided additional support
for the Court.'0 5 The RUAA provides that arbitrators are responsible for deciding
whether a "condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled. ' , 106 The Court
looked to the comments to the RUAA which states that:
[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues of substantive arbitrability... are for a court to decide and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e., whether prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel,
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been
met, are for the arbitrators to decide.'0 7
Finally, the Court acknowledged that NASD arbitrators, possessing more expertise about the meaning of their own rule, are comparatively better able to interpret and apply it.' 0 8 The Court reasoned that unless there is a statement to the
contrary in the arbitration agreement, it is reasonable to assume that parties intended the agreement to reflect the understanding that NASD arbitrators are in the
best position to interpret and apply the arbitration rules of the association.'0 9 The
Court added, "[F]or the law to assume an expectation that aligns (1)decisionmaker with (2) comparative expertise will help better to secure a fair and expedi99. Id.
100. Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
101. Id. at 83-84.
102. Id. at 84 (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943-46).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 84-85 (citing UAA § 6(b), 7 U.L.A. I (rev. 2000 Supp. 2002)).
Id.
Id. at 85 (citing RUAA § 6(c), cmt. 2 (emphasis added)).
Id.

109. Id.
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tious resolution of the underlying controversy-a goal of arbitration systems and
judicial systems alike."' 10
The Court concluded that the "NASD's time limit rule falls within the class of
gateway procedural disputes that do not present what [Supreme Court] cases have
presumption that would
called 'questions of arbitrability." '1" Thus the strong
2
submit such questions to the courts does not apply."
Dean Witter argued that "even without an anti-arbitration presumption," the
court should interpret the agreements between the parties as calling for judicial
determination of the time limit matter." 3 Focusing on the inclusion of the word
"eligible" in the Code's time limit rule, Dean Witter asserted that the word "indicates the parties' intent for the time limit rule to be resolved by the court prior to
arbitration."'1"4 The Court rejected this argument on the presumption that "parties
to an arbitration agreement would normally expect the forum-based [arbitrator] to
decide forum-specific procedural gateway matters." '"15 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that "any temptation here to place special anti-arbitration weight on the
appearance of the word 'eligible' in the NASD Code rule is counterbalanced by a
different NASD rule" that arbitrators are empowered by the NASD Code to interpret and decide the applicability of the NASD arbitration rules." 16
Therefore, the Court concluded that without an anti-arbitration presumption
and because the NASD's time limit rule does not fall within the class of gateway
procedural disputes regarded as "questions of arbitrability," it could not conclude
117
that parties intended to have a court, and not the arbitrator, apply the rule.
Thus, the Court held that8 the NASD arbitrator should apply the time limit rule to
the underlying dispute." 1
Concurring only in the judgment, Justice Thomas would also permit the
NASD arbitrator to apply the time limit." 9 Reasoning that because the parties
included a New York choice-of-law provision in the arbitration agreement, they
agreed to be20bound by New York law, which permits arbitrators to resolve time
limit issues.1
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Howsam is sound. Consistent with the
Court's interpretation of the FAA, the decision promotes the liberal policy favoring arbitration, ensuring the time and cost efficiency afforded by arbitration. The
importance of the Howsam decision is twofold. First, the decision resolves the
conflict among the circuit courts regarding the question of whether NASD arbitrators or courts apply the NASD's time limit rule. By deciding that the arbitrators
110. Id.
II1. Id.

112. Id. at 86.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id. at 87.
120. Id.
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are to apply the rule, the Court's holding will have a far-reaching impact on the
arbitration of disputes in the securities industry, injecting uniformity and certainty
into the arbitration process, which was non-existent under the circuit split. Second, the outcome offers protection to investors from judicial attacks on the eligibility of their claims for arbitration and on post-arbitration awards, ultimately
increasing investor confidence in the securities industry.
The Supreme Court, while holding that NASD Code § 10304 is for the arbitrator to apply, stopped short of deciding a crucial issue present in the instant case.
The Court did not determine the extent to which § 10324 provides the "clear and
unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intention to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. By not deciding the issue, the Court, as in AT&T Technologies' 21 and First Options,122 again failed to specify what language would satisfy
the clear and unmistakable standard.
A.

Consistency with Supreme Court's Interpretationof the FAA

The Court's decision in Howsam follows Supreme Court precedent of interpreting the FAA as establishing a national policy favoring arbitration.' 2 3 The
purpose of this policy in favor of arbitration is to prohibit courts from refusing to
enforce valid agreements to arbitrate and to "move the parties ... out of court and
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible."'124 The presumption favoring
arbitration, however, is only applicable when there is ambiguity as to whether the
parties intended the arbitrator or a court to decide an issue.' 25 Because NASD
Code § 10304, the time-limit rule before the Court, made no indication of whether
the arbitrator or a court was to apply it, the national policy favoring arbitration
empowers the arbitrator to do so.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one goal of the FAA is to encourage speedy and efficient dispute resolution. It stated, "Contracts to arbitrate
are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the
courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one
of the very risks the
' 26
parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate."'
Allowing courts to decide the timeliness issues would result in such problems. Courts would be required to conduct judicial proceedings often touching
upon the merits of the case, in order to determine whether a claim is timely and
should thus go to arbitration. The problem with allowing these pre-arbitration
judicial proceedings to determine whether claims fall within the six-year period is
evident in Hofmann.127 There, the Third Circuit instructed the trial court at length
on what it could and could not do when deciding the timeliness issue. 28 The
court stated that the trial court would have to hold a hearing and would have to

121. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
122. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
123. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
124. Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
125. Id. at 24-25.
126. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).

127. PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3rd Cir. 1993).
128. Id. at 1380.
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receive extrinsic evidence to decide which claims are arbitrable., 29 The court
acknowledged that "the district court will be forced to walk a fine line" to adhere
to the rule that courts must not decide potential merits of the underlying claims
and that "it will be impossible to give full effect to both of these goals ...,,30
The Supreme Court in John Wiley13' recognized this dilemma, as did the
Court in the instant case. It is evident that allowing courts to conduct these prearbitration "minitrials" to decide under NASD Code § 10304 whether a claim is
timely, will result in extra costs and delays, problems the FAA was designed to
avoid. By removing the question of timeliness from the courts, the Supreme
Court preserves the time and cost efficiency provided by arbitration and in turn
promotes the federal policy favoring arbitration.
B. Resolving the Circuit Court Split
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Howsam, the circuit split over who
was to apply NASD Code § 10304 caused confusion and inconsistency for the
securities industry's arbitration process. 132 If parties were located in the jurisdiction of a circuit court which held that courts are to apply the time limit rule, investors might face judicial proceedings to determine the arbitrability of claims before
being allowed to engage in the arbitration of those claims. Securities firms had to
anticipate where claims would be filed in order to plan their defenses on eligibility
grounds, strategies of which largely depended on whether the firms would be
defending in an arbitral or judicial forum. This would be particularly problematic
for the large securities and brokerage firms that currently dominate the investment
landscape considering their presence virtually worldwide. Likewise, location
within a particular circuit court jurisdiction would affect the arbitrators themselves
in preparing for and conducting the arbitration proceedings. The particular locale
would dictate whether
they would or would not be allowed to determine the time33
liness of claims.1
With their decision in Howsam, the Supreme Court has removed the confusion and uncertainty resulting from the divergent circuit holdings. Now, investors
and security firms alike can expect and rely on the fact that an arbitrator and not a
court will decide whether claims are eligible under NASD Code § 10304. Investors can be confident that they need only to resort to a single forum to have their
disputes heard. Securities firms can approach the defense of these disputes more
uniformly, and arbitrators can better prepare for arbitration proceedings.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated that he would have focused
on the presence of the choice-of-law clause in the arbitration agreement which
134
provided that the agreement be interpreted according to New York state law.
While the outcome would be the same in the instant case, that the arbitrator would
decide the timeliness of Howsam's claim, Justice Thomas's approach would make
the issue of who is to apply NASD Code § 10304 contingent upon which body of
129. Id.
130. Id.

131.
132.
133.
134.

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
See id.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 87 (2002).
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law the choice-of-law provision refers.' 35 Not only would this approach fail to
alleviate any of the confusion and uncertainty present under the circuit split, it
could well result in a great deal more. The possible bodies of law that could be
included in an arbitration agreement are vastly more numerable when compared to
the comparatively fewer circuit courts. The majority's approach, while achieving
the same result as Justice Thomas's, does so with the added benefit of increased
uniformity and consistency.
C. Investor Protection
Although securities arbitration is touted as a speedy and inexpensive alternative to litigation, brokerage companies can impose expensive and lengthy litigation before the investor ever reaches arbitration. The Supreme Court's decision
protects investors from judicial attacks on the eligibility of their claims for arbitration. Under Howsam, the Court grants the arbitrator the power to apply NASD
Code § 10304 in all instances.' 36 Securities firms can no longer seek to stay arbitration in a court arguing that a claim is untimely.
There is a general belief that arbitrators will apply the time limit rule less rigidly than courts basing their decisions on what is "'fair,' 'just,' or 'sensible' under
the circumstances.' 37 A party with a claim challenged as untimely, would fare
better in arbitration than in court, where the arbitrators might apply the time limit
rule with more flexibility and allow the running of the time limit to begin upon
discovery of the circumstances leading to the claim rather than the original purchase of the investment. Thus, it is of vast importance to the party seeking arbitration of a possibly untimely claim, usually the investor, to know who determines
whether the claim is eligible under the time limit rule: a judge or an arbitrator. As
a result, brokerage companies often attempt to use the courts in an attempt to have
claims declared ineligible. 38 If a court declares the claim untimely, then the investor would not only be prohibited from arbitration but would also be precluded
from filing the claim in court.' 39 With the Court's holding in Howsam, investors
can avoid the extra cost of litigation and be confident that securities firms will be
bound to arbitrate timeliness and
that it is an arbitrator who will decide whether a
140
claim is eligible for arbitration.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 86.
137. Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez, and the New Rules:
Can hIvestors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1248 (1990); see also Quinton F.
Seamons, Does Securities Arbitration Go On Forever? Eligibility and Statutes of Limitation, 8
INSIGHTS 17,.19 (May 1994) (stating that arbitrators, aware that an adverse decision would deny the
customer's "day in arbitration," do not generally address the motions regarding timeliness until the
merits of the dispute have been resolved).
138. See, e.g., Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476 (10th Cir.
1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 38 (11th Cir. 1995); Paine
Webber v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1383 (3d Cir. 1993).
139. See, Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1996); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
McCoy, No. 94-5779, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37080 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 1995); Saunderson v. Gary
Goldberg & Co., Inc., 899 F .Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Conroy v. Merrill Lynch, 899 F. Supp. 1471
(W.D.N.C, 1995); Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, 855 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
140. Supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
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The Howsam decision also protects investors from post-arbitration attacks on
arbitrators' awards. Brokerage companies, unable to convince arbitrators to declare claims ineligible, have been successful in persuading courts to vacate arbitration awards on the grounds that the arbitrators exceeded their authority in deciding
the timeliness issue. 141 In Howsam, the Supreme Court granted the necessary
authority to arbitrators. 142 Arbitrators do not exceed their authority by deciding
whether claims comply with the six-year rule. As a result, securities firms will be
unable to appeal an arbitrator's award, arguing that the arbitrator did not have the
authority to decide NASD Code § 10304 issues.
Although the Supreme Court concluded that arbitrators will not exceed their
authority by determining timeliness issues, the Court did not resolve whether it is
within an arbitrator's authority to apply equitable arguments to declare a claim
timely even though the securities underlying the dispute were purchased more
than six years before the filing of the claim. The FAA allows for a court to vacate
an arbitration award where arbitrators have "exceeded their powers.' 43 However,
as long as the arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the ... agreement," and
to his/her duties, the award is legitimate and will not be
the arbitrator is faithful
144
vacated by a court.
In the instant case, the underlying claim was discovered more than six years
following the purchase of the partnership interests underlying the claim. 45 If the
six-year time limit were strictly applied, Howsam would effectively have lost her
claim before she even knew it existed. 46 In Hofmann, the Court explained that a
brokerage company's active concealment of its wrongdoing can be "viewed as an
independent cause of action .. . ,,47 The NASD's Director of Arbitration has
expressed the position that "the purchase date is not [necessarily] the event or
occurrence giving rise to [the] dispute."' 148 Thus, considering the significant deference courts give to the decisions of arbitrators, there is little likelihood that an
award will be vacated due to an arbitrator allowing the six-year time limit to run
upon discovery of the claim rather than the purchase of the underlying securities.
This is especially critical given the recent increase in discovery of claims relating to investments in partnership interests, often purchased many years earlier.
Additionally, because securities firms are currently selling other products whose
value cannot be determined for many years, persons investing in such vehicles can
be assured
that they will not lose their claims even before those claims are discov49
erable. 1

141. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1992).
142. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86.
143. FAA § 10(4).
144. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
145. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82.
146. Id.
147. PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1381 (3d Cir. 1993).
148. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 385 (11 th Cir. 1995) (citing
Seamons, supra note 137).
149. Harding, supra note 79, at 144.
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D. NASD Code § 10324: Clear and Unmistakable Evidence?
In both AT&T Technologies and First Options, the Supreme Court failed to
clarify what language would constitute the clear and unmistakable evidence necessary to remove arbitrability questions from the courts and place them in the
hands of the arbitrators.' 50 In Howsam, the Court again failed to establish such a
standard despite the presence of NASD Code § 10324 which states that
"[a]rbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of
all provisions under this Code."''
The Court's only reference to NASD Code §
10324 was as a counter to Dean Witter's assertion that the appearance of the word
"eligible" in the NASD Code indicated the parties' intention that a court apply the
time limit rule.' 52 The Court never answered the question of whether NASD Code
§ 10324 provided the clear and unmistakable evidence needed to submit the timeliness issue to the arbitrator or what language would satisfy that standard. As a
result, the Court in Howsam, as it did in AT&T Technologies and First Options,
left the determination to be made by inference from the Court's application of the
standard to the specific facts of the each of the cases.
The question of whether NASD Code § 10324 provided the clear and unmistakable evidence necessary to grant arbitrators the power to determine questions
of arbitrability was a point of contention for many of the circuit courts deciding
NASD Code § 10304 timeliness issues. 53 Four circuits, the Sixth, 5 4 Seventh, 55
Tenth, 156 and Eleventh,' 57 have interpreted NASD Code § 10324 to not be clear
and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intention to allow the arbitrator to apply
the six-year rule. Two circuits, the Second 58 and Eighth, 59 have reached contrary
interpretations, ruling that NASD Code § 10324 does provide the clear and unmistakable evidence necessary to permit the arbitrator to decide arbitrability. By not
resolving the question of whether or not NASD Code § 10324 satisfies the clear
and unmistakable standard, the Supreme Court leaves the door open for future
litigation regarding the impact of NASD Code § 10324 on questions of arbitrability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Howsam promotes the longstanding policy
in favor of arbitration. The decision ensures the time and cost efficiency afforded
150. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
151. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86 (citing NASD Code § 10324).
152. Id.
153. See Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 96-97 (6th Cir. 1997); PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1200-1201 (2d Cir. 1996); Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 78 F.3d 474,480 (10th Cir. 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d
381, 384 (11 th Cir. 1995); FSC Securities Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir.1994); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F,2d 509, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1992).
154. Sarver, 108 F.3d at 96-97.
155. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 513.
156. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 480.
157. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 384.
158. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1200-01.
159. Freel, 14 F.3d at 1312-13.
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581

by arbitration. Holding that the arbitrator is to apply the rule, the Court resolves
the conflict among the circuit courts regarding the question of whether the arbitrator or a court is to apply the NASD's time limit rule. In doing so, the decision
removes the confusion and uncertainty from the securities arbitration process and
increases investor protection. However, by not establishing the clear and unmistakable standard necessary to remove questions of arbitrability from the courts and
place them in the hands of arbitrators, the Court again fails to close the door to
future litigation.
JAMES
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